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Arabicisation and the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy

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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we review the historical and cultural worldliness of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy with a focus on its linguistic ideology of operation and discursive representation. The paper has three key objectives: first, to show that Arabic language academies emerged as decolonising institutions in a context of struggle to fix the 'image' of Arabic through specific textual practices of representation. We inspect how the naturalising effect of the dominant institutional ideology of Arabic relies on its capacity to function through other discourses. As a second objective, we contend that since the cultural policy of Arabicisation is closely linked with institutional power and subjectivity, it dialectically contributes to the maintenance of less officially recognised linguistic resources as significant proxies in the discursive struggle for recognition. Our third objective is to compare and contrast the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy with the Higher Commission for Arabicisation in the Sudan. Our argument here is that as an effect of the contestation over what counts as 'Arabic', Arabicisation is always an incomplete process. Our analysis of the cultural political world of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy draws on the insights and conceptual tools provided by historical and discourse studies.

KEYWORDS Sudan; Khartoum Arabic Language Academy; Arabicisation; Higher Commission for Arabicisation; Arabic Language Academies

Introduction

Language academies are extremely important in shaping our understanding of language. The observation that 'standard languages' are historical creations is now generally accepted in critical sociolinguistic studies; however, most of the disciplined research is conducted within standard-language cultures (Milroy and Milroy 1985). Although people do not encounter language as it appears 'in the dictionary', the mainstream linguistic theoretical discourse

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has significantly shaped lay people's views of what language 'should look like' (Linell 2001). In the Arab world, language academies emerged as decolonising institutions to contribute to the construction of politically marked (pan-) national identities (Sawaie 2006).

Arabic academies have recently been rivalled by the emergence of other Arabic language regulators including the nationally based and generously funded governmental language commissions and translocal mass-mediated satellites such as Al Jazeera. In this paper, we engage with the 'worldliness' (Said 1975) of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy. That is, we focus on the historical and political conditions of its constitution. The article intends to achieve three objectives: first, to situate the Khartoum Academy in its wider cultural and material circumstances, focusing on the significant role it plays in the reproduction of a particular ideological value for Arabic as a resource for membership in a (pan-)linguistic community. As we will show, although the political situation in Sudan is instrumental in understanding the emergence of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy, it is this symbolic function (membership of the Arabic-speaking community), among other things, that it is designed to serve. We contend that in the context of Sudan, the normalising effect of the dominant institutional ideology of Arabic depends mainly on its capacity to operate through a discursive complex. It should be stressed that there is no direct link between Islam and the promotion of Standard Arabic. The status and distribution of Standard Arabic in the Syrian (secular) institutions of the 1990s is a case in point. In the context of Sudan, however, we demonstrate that a necessary link is forged by powerful actors and institutions to rationalise the imposition of a particular political project.

As a second objective, we argue that in the context of Sudan, since Arabicisation is closely linked with power and subjectivity, it dialectically contributes to the visibility of less officially recognised linguistic resources as significant proxies in the social struggle for recognition. Our third objective is to compare and contrast the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy with the Higher Commission for Arabicisation in the Sudan. Our argument here is that the heterogeneity 'within' Standard Arabic is an effect of the discursive struggle between institutions characterised by similar language ideologies. In the course of doing so, we show that Arabicisation is inherently an incomplete process: it is either described as 'not enough' (as in the case of the Higher Commission) or 'too enough' (as in the case of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy). Part of the explanation, we maintain, lies in the dynamic conditions of its possibility and the contingent nature of the language itself. It should also be remarked that it is not the magnitude of sociolinguistic diversity that gives Sudan a unique identity. Multilingualism and multiculturalism are characteristic of all (modern) human societies whether in Europe, Africa or the Arab world. It is how this (version of) multiculturalism is regulated,

managed or (ab)normalised by socio-political institutions, and how these processes and their effects are perceived, incorporated, or resisted by the different sections that make each society unique. Although there are patterns of convergence and relatively shared history among various societies at the macro-sociological level, individuals and groups in each society have their own historical trajectories and appropriation strategies of dealing with centripetal ideologies (e.g. the imposition of a particular colonial or nationalist vision). That is why there are no two situations or contexts even within a given community that can ever be entirely identical.

The article is structured into six sections. In the next section, we sketch a conceptual framework for analysis and discussion of the textual materials. In the third section, we provide a broad contextualising background about Sudan. The fourth section considers the case of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy in comparison with the Higher Commission for Arabicisation. In the fifth section, we subject the linguistic ideology of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy to detailed scrutiny. The final section concludes the article.

A conceptual framework: language academies and linguistic ideologies

One of the key functions of ideologies of language (i.e. systematic beliefs about linguistic structure and use) is to naturalise the dynamic nature of social orders (Silverstein 1979; Joseph and Taylor 1990; Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998; Blommaert 1999; Kroskrity 2000). In the sociolinguistic literature, this normative ordering of social life can be illustrated with reference to standard-language cultures characterised by the concept of 'diglossia' (Ferguson 1959; for extensions, revisions and reviews, see Fishman 1967; Ferguson 1991; Fernandez 1993; Kaye 1994; Hymes 1996; Hudson 2002; Bassiouney 2009; Suleiman 2013). In his classic paper, Ferguson (1959) defined the concept of 'diglossia' as:

> A relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superimposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature; either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation. (Ferguson 1959, 336)

For Ferguson, Arabic diglossia as a special kind of bilingualism is a feature of the national sociolinguistic regime in which Arabic varieties are normatively stratified into 'High' variety (Standard Arabic) and 'Low' variety (the Colloquial). Ferguson (1959) suggested a cluster of nine characteristics of diglossic

language situations: function, prestige, literary heritage, acquisition, standardisation, stability, grammar, lexicon and phonology. These diglossic properties are proposed to describe the socially structured heterogeneity within Arabic. Diglossic language situations are historical constructions; however, they appear to be 'natural' as an effect of the institutionalisation of the dominant ideology of language by access-controlling regulators such as language academies, the education system and the bureaucracy. Examining the cultural and material affiliations (the 'worldliness' in Said's 1975 terms) of the language academies should lead us to situate them in wider macro-level contexts including their historical trajectories, doxological values or undisputed assumptions, their relations with the world of brute politics of (pan-)nationalism and state institutions, and recruited readership/audience. From the standpoint of the context of global modern institutions (e.g. nation-state), these language academies are largely shaped by the organising cultural discourses of colonialism (Smith 1991; Bensmaïa 2003; Makoni and Pennycook 2007; Errington 2008); structural imperialism and Orientalism (Said 1978; Mitchell 1988); globalising modernity (Giddens 1990; Corner and Harvey 1991; Bauman 1998; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Miller et al. 2007; Blommaert 2010) and (pan-)nationalisms (Anderson 1991; Billig 1995; Suleiman 2003).

Let us briefly define some of these concepts as they will be used in the cultural political analysis of Khartoum Arabic Language Academy, since it operates within a diglossic national sociolinguistic order. Said's (1978) thesis of 'Orientalism' uses Foucault's (1972) concept of discourse (a set of normalising statements and social practices) to document the patterns of representation through which the West imagined itself by constructing the 'Orient' (particularly the Islamic world) as its exotic 'Other'. Colonialism drew on existing discourses of Orientalism. Colonisation was rationalised in the name of a specific form of 'modernity', which shaped the national cultural orders in which Arabic language academies emerged. The emergence of language academies in the Arab world is strongly shaped by these cultural forces and historical conditions. For example, the idea of the first scientific academy in the Arab world can be construed as a colonial invention (Mitchell 1988). The Institut d'Egypte was established in Egypt during the Napoleonic invasion (1798–1801), and disbanded by the end of the French occupation (Sawaie 2006, 634). The point here is not related to the linguistic standardisation of Arabic, since Muslim scholastics had long standardised a variety of Arabic for hermeneutic functions. It specifically concerns the filtering perspective through which a local metapragmatic pattern of valuation was systematically dismantled and replaced. Napoleonic invasion was a much more complex epistemological disciplinary exercise than merely a military conquest (Said 1978; Mitchell 1988; Prakash 1995). It resulted in the institutionalisation of a very seriously defining discourse of cultural appropriation within which not just the discursive 'image' of the entire region but the 'West' itself would be

relationally interpreted. As Mitchell (2000) argued, the panoptical model of governance as theorised by Foucault (1977) was invented and implemented not in Europe but in the colonies. The panoptical gaze involves, among other things, the painstaking process of subjectification: an imaginative creation shot through with a local validation of a 'French version' of Egypt. And the argument here is that Anderson's (1991) 'imagined' categories of identification (e.g. 'French', 'Egyptian') are a product of colonial encounters rather than self-sufficiently pre-given entities (see Hall and Gieben 1992).

Furthermore, modernity as an unfinished project provided the necessary conditions for standard languages to index a plethora of binary values such as 'primitive vs. civilised', 'traditional vs. modern' and 'cultural vs. historical' (Auer and Schmidt 2010). Modernity is an ongoing project because consciousness of what counts as 'new' at a particular historical juncture is always conceptualised in contrast to specific elements of 'tradition'; however, this 'new development' would itself be devalued and surpassed by innovations of a new style of life (Habermas 1997). Language academies as 'verbal hygienists' (Cameron 1995) are integrated within the project of modernity and its processes. In her study of Arabic varieties in Egypt (including Standard Arabic), Stadlbauer (2010) argued that:

> The language ideologies of these varieties are a product of both the past and the present: they emerged during British colonialism in the late nineteenth century and are maintained in the postcolonial climate through discourses on the purity of Classical Arabic, on the linguistic corruption of the dialects, and on the increasing use of English as a symbol of Western capitalism and modernity. (1)

Processes of capitalist and cultural globalisation have resulted in the emergence of 'superdiverse' societies and unorthodox forms of language (Vertovec 2006; Blommaert 2010). It is a situation characterised with discursive simultaneity: 'places' previously identified with a dominant textual economy have now been turned into 'non-places' (Auge 1995) in/across which multiple patterns of interpretation are simultaneously present in the cultural landscape (Shohamy and Gorter 2009; Blommaert 2010; Canagarajah 2013). However, nationalist regimes of language viewed these late-modern conditions as a threat. Thus, the institutional intervention to 'protect heritage', which is linked to structured subjectivities, is rationalised by calling for a regulation of language use. This means that linguistic features authoritatively defined by the language regulator as 'standard' have become ideologically indexical in social interaction: the linguistic structure is socially imbued with anchoring indexicalities (e.g. achieving a specific sort of identity or specific economic and political power).

In the light of colonialism reinforced by Orientalism, Arabic language academies are constituted as decolonising institutions to transform the subordinating linguistic marketplace created by colonial structures of power. Hence,

their knowledge products are canons of power (they redefined what is considered a 'national language'). They are concerned with language planning and policy issues (for a review of 'language planning/policy', see Haugen 1972; Kaplan and Baldauf 1997; Watts 2001; Ricento 2006; Shohamy 2006). Language planning as a theoretical practice was profoundly informed by the principle of 'methodological nationalism' (Hoffmann 2008) which also significantly underlies the concept of 'diglossia' (e.g. Ferguson 1959 used 'Egypt'). The nation-state as an 'imagined' project of (civic–territorial) belonging is a product of a European ideology (Anderson 1991). As Edwards (2012b) noted, prescriptivism and the associated desire to 'preserve/protect' linguistic boundaries, is a result of the decline of Latin and the emergence of European languages as markers of national identity. In other words, language academies are creations of nation-states and thus their symbolic purchase should not be equated with their relative failure with regard to grammatical and lexical productions (Thomas 1991). The western language academies emerged in the Renaissance with the Italian Accademia della Crusca founded in 1584 as the first academy of its type. The Académie française was established in 1635, and the Real Academia Española followed in 1713 (for a detailed discussion, see Joseph 1987; Mugglestone 2001). Apart from the English Academy of South Africa, which was founded in 1961 as an advisory body, no government-sponsored English language academy has ever been established in the UK or the USA (Edwards 2012b). However, Samuel Johnson's dictionary (appeared in 1755) and that of Noah Webster (published in 1828) are considered to be instances of 'one-man' academies in Britain and America, respectively (Edwards 2012a, 2012b). A typology aside, virtually any country in the world has a public or private language-management body (Mackey 1991). To undo the effects of colonialism, most post-colonial governments opted for discrimination on the basis of language; hence, their linguistic watchdogs were inevitably based on ethnicity. This should be unsurprising if we conceptualise 'prescriptivism' as an ideological practice not about language per se but rather about the social value of a language. Social roles prescribe specific linguistic choices and exclude others. Linguistic choices are also value choices in the sense that our oriented linguistic practice mutually indexes specific frames of participation and membership.

The early Arabic language academies were modelled on their European predecessors (Sawaie 2006). For example, the leading Damascus Language Academy (established in 1919) and the Cairo Arabic Language Academy (founded in 1932) were both patterned after the Académie française (Sawaie 2006). Damascus and the Cairo academies inspired the development of later academies and similar Arabic language regulators including, among others, the Iraqi Academy (formed in 1947); the Jordanian Academy (properly established in 1976); the academies and Arabic language commissions in North Africa (e.g. Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, established between 1980

and 1996); the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy (1993), and most recently, the Palestinian Language Academy (set up in 2013). The activities of Arabic language academies are coordinated by the Union of Arabic Language Academies, which was established in 1971 (Sawaie 2006).

The ideology of monolingualism as a nation-building strategy is indicated by the language academies' obsession with the production of textual artefacts (e.g. dictionaries). The key task of language academies is the 'standardisation' and promotion of a preferred norm of linguistic usage. Standardisation involves the imposition of uniformity or invariance on linguistic structure (Milroy and Milroy 1985; Joseph 1987). This agenda renders language academies ideological institutions par excellence. A significant difference between European language academies and their later counterparts in the Arab world is that the focus of the former was not on the preservation of the existing standard (Latin) but rather on the normative and conservative institutionalisation of the sub-standard 'vernaculars' as nation-state languages (mainly 'the Romance languages').

By contrast, the Arabic academies focused on the existing well-codified language and debased the vernacular as a 'non-language' or at best a 'corruption' of the standard. However, these early European language-planning institutions were informed by a static, structuralist perspective on society in which institutional and cultural relations are taken as 'givens' with language only being considered as a mediator. The role of language academies has recently been largely taken up by well-funded institutions (e.g. universities) and government commissions. Consequently, the function of language academies has become ceremonial as a result of a severe lack of financial support. However, the alternative language regulators in the Arab world generally operate according to similar ideological principles with a relatively more complex cultural politics. And this is where, to use Suleiman's (2013) term, the 'fray' over the symbolic order is not between the standard and the dialect but 'within' the standard itself. With this conceptual background, we move to explore the worldliness of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy with a focus on how in the context of Sudan its political and ideological affiliations are negotiated and gradually superseded by government-supported bodies such as the Higher Commission for Arabicisation.

Sudan: a contextualising note

Present-day Sudan is geographically bordered by Egypt and Libya to the North and the northwest respectively; Chad and the Central African Republic to the West and the southwest respectively; the Republic of South Sudan to the South, and Ethiopia and Eritrea to the East. Pre-2011 Sudan (before the separation of South Sudan) was under a Turkish colonial regime, which was ended by the Mahdist revolution in 1881 (Warburg 2003). The Mahdist political

system was in turn destroyed by the Anglo-Egyptian occupation (1898–1956) during which Sudan was reconstructed as a modern nation-state (Powell 2003). However, particular sediments of this layered history are accentuated, transformed and codified as part of the 'imagined' national legacy (Sharkey 2003). The British colonial regime governed the country by administratively dividing it into two antagonistic parts, namely the 'South', which was identified with Christianity, local language and English, and the 'North', which was characterised by Islam and Arabic.

Following independence, post-colonial nationalist governments (whether democratically elected or not) pursued the aggressive implementation of homogenising policies to undo the detrimental effects of the British colonial rule. Arabic and Islam have been used as the cultural principles upon which most nationalist programmes (e.g. Sudanisation) are based (Maḥmud 1984; Nyombe 1997; Miller 2003; Sharkey 2008; James 2008). These nationalist projects have triggered one of the longest wars in the history of Africa in Southern Sudan, which rejected these centralising cultural policies. The Southern Sudan became an independent state in 2011 following a peace agreement (known as the Naivasha/Comprehensive Peace Agreement) which gave the South the right to secede through a referendum (see O'Leary 2012 for a review on the 'break-up of Sudan').

Furthermore, although the medium of instruction in pre-university education was Arabicised in the 1960s, the means of teaching in the higher education system continued to be English until the beginning of the 1990s when it was changed by the military regime of President Omer al-Beshir. Al-Beshir's National Salvation government, which is supported by Turabi's Islamist movement, overturned a democratic government in June 1989. It has since then declared an ideological project called *al-mashru' al-haḍari* (literally 'the Civilisation Project').

Generally, *al-mashru' al-haḍari* is a state-supported modernisation project suggested by the Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi to redefine the existing dominant practice in all its dimensions. This Islamist scheme was intended not just to confer legitimacy over the military regime but also to enforce a particular version of Islam (El-Affendi 1990). For al-Turabi, western modernity is not to be implemented wholesale but in articulation with the principles of Islam and in the process both of them would be transformed (Ibrahim 1999). Thus, one of the key objectives of the ruling regime is the reconstitution of 'national identity' in its own Islamist terms (Deng 1995; Idris 2005; Leach 2012). The medium of instruction in the majority of universities was mainly English. This is viewed by the ideological project as a colonial legacy; hence, Arabic is legislated to replace English and the Higher Commission for Arabicisation is established to implement this policy.

The Khartoum Arabic Language Academy is also formed in the same context to help in the process. Thus, Arabicisation as a discourse is closely linked with other dimensions of this modernisation project. In short, *al-mashru'*

al-haḍari is fundamentally a project of cultural regulation. However, the 'official' value of Arabic is always in competition with other discourses on language such as English. The proliferation of privately run English-medium schools is a case in point. The symbolic value of English is enhanced at the 'unofficial' level by the ruling regime itself through its market-oriented privatisation policies. Although understanding the effects of the Naivasha language policy in post-2011 Sudan should be found out through further empirical investigation, we make the following two remarks. First, minority language movements and community language activists (e.g. in the Nuba Mountains) have used the Naivasha language policy as a framework to rationalise their linguistic standardisation activities and to defend the right to mother-tongue (primary) education (Mugaddam and Abdelhay 2014). So, the Naivasha language policy has contributed to the raising of collective awareness among some social groups of the value of their non-official linguistic resources (for a critique, see Abdelhay et al. 2016). Second, at the level of formal politics, Naivasha language policy is silenced following the separation of the South.

Shortly prior to the Southern Sudanese referendum, President Beshir's ruling party hastened to assert its intention to abandon the Naivasha language policy and to reinstate a monolingual policy of Arabicisation instead. In a widely publicised address at a rally, President Beshir declared that

> if South Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity … Sharia (Islamic law) and Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language.[1]

This position may not be surprising if we think of language policies not just as official formulations concerning the status of a given language but, most importantly, as an attempt to do politics by the proxy of language. Thus, when we come to analyse language policies whether endorsed by the state or non-governmental institutions such as language academies, we should not focus on language and exclude politics because, as we mentioned previously, language-policy statements are products of various and, at times, conflicting social and material conditions of existence (for a review of the colonial and post-colonial language policies in the Sudan, see Abdelhay et al. 2011).

With the above broad contextualising note about Sudan in mind, we proceed to comparatively review the key objectives of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy and the Higher Commission for Arabicisation.

Khartoum Arabic Language Academy and the Higher Commission for Arabicisation

In this section, we review the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy (henceforth: the Khartoum Academy) in a comparative intertextual mode with the

Higher Commission for Arabicisation (henceforth: the Higher Commission). We start with some basic information about these institutions in terms of their sets of objectives, their internal coherence and membership. We begin with the Khartoum Academy and then consider the Higher Commission in comparison.

The idea to set up an Arabic language academy in Sudan may be traced back to the first half of the 1980s. In December 1982, in an address at a conference on Arabic language, President Numeiri asserted the role of Arabic in the community and education, and declared a number of steps and measures to promote it including: (1) establishing a council for language planning; (2) setting up an Arabic language academy in the Sudan and (3) activating the policy of Arabicisation in higher education and scientific research. In 1983, the National Council for Higher Education issued a set of decisions and recommendations directing the implementation of the Arabicisation policy in all institutions of higher education (al-Lajna al-Sudaniyya li-l-Ta`rib 1983). Universities were granted relative freedom to formulate appropriate programmes to implement the policy. The University of Khartoum approved the implementation of the policy for the faculties of Arts, Education, and Law in the same year, to be extended to other faculties in the following academic year of 1984–1985. However, this policy of Arabicising the medium of instruction at the university level was not implemented (see Taha 1990 for assessment and discussion). A full-fledged Arabic language academy was established by the National Salvation government in 1993 (the current ruling party). Most significantly, the regime also established the Higher Commission for Arabicisation as a governmental institution dedicated to the Arabicisation of the medium of teaching in university education.

In 1991, a presidential authorisation was issued to establish Majma` al-Lugha al-`Arabiyya in Khartoum (the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy). The Khartoum Academy was inaugurated on 14 January 1993. It joined the Union of Arabic Language Academies in 1995. The Khartoum Academy's inauguration event consisted, among other things, of (1) an official speech by the Minster of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Ibrahim Aḥmed `Omer (1996); (2) a speech by the representative of the Arabic language academies of Cairo, Amman, Baghdad and Damascus (it was delivered by the Egyptian scholar Kamal Moḥammed Desuqi) and (3) an address by the founding president of the Khartoum Academy (`Abdallah al-Ṭayyib). The Khartoum Academy was largely modelled after the Cairo Arabic Language Academy (established in 1932). The late al-Ṭayyib was himself a member of the Cairo Academy. The main focus of the Khartoum Academy is on corpus-planning issues (e.g. combating widespread errors in Sudanese Arabic media). The Khartoum Academy is also implicated in issues of status planning in its effort to 'legitimise' the domains of Standard Arabic.

The official journal of the Khartoum Academy (*Majallat Majma` al-Lugha al-`Arabiyya*) appeared in 1996. Inside the front cover of the first issue, the *Majalla* opens with some of the commonly cited Qur'anic verses concerning the status of Arabic. The Qur'an as a sacred text is quite often used as an intertextual strategy in theoretical argumentations to accord special status to Arabic. Also worth mentioning is that two articles are devoted to the correction of commonly used 'errors' in Arabic (read: Standard Arabic). The first issue of the *Majalla* embodied the statement of the goals of the Khartoum Academy. The Khartoum Academy laid out the following objectives:

(1) to preserve the Arabic language and promote its rhetorical capacities informed by the Qur'an, prophetic teachings (ḥadith), and poetic tradition;
(2) to conduct scientific research on Arabic as a means to achieve this end;
(3) to maintain and strengthen relations with other Arabic language academies through exchanging research output, reports and journals, and appoint recommended members from them to the Khartoum Academy;
(4) to combat widespread linguistic errors through training and education in Arabic grammar and stylistics;
(5) to encourage Arabic scholarship through scientific enquiry and intellectual authorship;
(6) to revive and disseminate Arab heritage in Sudan;
(7) to compile and translate non-Arabic materials;
(8) to publish a journal;
(9) to encourage and support translation and Arabicisation;
(10) to contribute to the improvement of translation by monitoring the products of other official institutions engaged in the process of Arabicisation.

These objectives of the Khartoum Academy can be said to constitute two significant standardisation aspects: the hierarchical ordering of linguistic resources (e.g. promotion of Standard Arabic) and register control (linguistic correction). Mobilising the 'tradition of linguistic complaint' (Milroy and Milroy 1985, 36), the Khartoum Academy believes that Standard Arabic is deteriorating in Sudan, and that the oral performance of newsreaders and Arabic teachers is suffering from 'solecism' (*laḥn*, 'linguistic corruption'; for a discussion of the history of the term, see Suleiman 2003). The Khartoum Academy issued a memorandum on teaching Arabic (mudhakirat `an-ta`lim al-lugha al-`arabiyya) in which it recommended that the study of the Arabic grammatical tradition and literary heritage should be encouraged and supported by the state policy of education (al-Ṭayyib 1996c). The memorandum urged the appointment of Arabic editors and proofreaders in publishing houses, newspapers and printing presses to correct the widely spread

grammatical errors in their publications. It also embodied a proposal for establishing an Arabic teacher training institute. The Khartoum Academy is engaged in the training of TV and radio news broadcasters in Standard Arabic.

The Khartoum Academy is an independent body established by a grant from the government and with advisory power. Its structure of membership is largely 'non-partisan' in the sense that members are selected on the basis of linguistic or literary achievement in Arabic. Membership of the Khartoum Academy is open to scholars from outside the Sudan (e.g. other Arabic language academies) recognised for their scholarship in Arabic linguistics and literature. The Khartoum Academy was presided over by a Professor of Arabic language `Abdallah al-Ṭayyib. Al-Ṭayyib was a graduate of Khartoum University and received his PhD from the University of London in 1950. He was, among many achievements, a co-winner in 2000 of the King Faisal International Prize in Arabic language and literature. His public image is (perceived as) a symbol of Arabic intellectual scholarship. He ceaselessly presented himself as a guardian of Arabic viewed as the 'legitimate language' (in Bourdieu's 1991 sense), and as we show in the discussion section, it is upon this basis that he demonised other Arabic language regulators that lack the required symbolic capital (knowledge of the Qur'an and Arabic grammatical tradition).

The Khartoum Academy focuses on Arabic and culture in their 'High' mode. Its targeted audience is not restricted to universities but is also open to other official public domains of language use (e.g. journalism). For the Khartoum Academy, Arabicisation involves, to deploy Suleiman's (2003, 11) term, the elimination of the 'Otherness' of Arabic (European languages, Arabic colloquials, etc.). The Khartoum Academy sporadically holds commemorative events in honour of highly distinguished scholars in the fields of Arabic poetry and Arabic grammatical tradition. It is noticeable that the Khartoum Academy was established under the conditions of *al-mashru` al-haḍari*; however, it would be misleading to presume that its then founding president (`Abdallah al-Ṭayyib) supported this ideological scheme. In fact, the Khartoum Academy detached itself from the entire political situation and distanced itself from its political project. Its declared mission is largely scientific in orientation by focusing on the combating of 'linguistic corruption' and the promotion of standard patterns of Arabic language use in the educational and journalistic fields. Some of the above objectives of the Khartoum Academy can be considered as a work in progress (e.g. promoting standard patterns of Arabic), while other objectives such as the production of a journal are already achieved. We should also stress that the Khartoum Academy is under-resourced, since it is not a governmental body.

In Section 2 we mentioned in passing that the struggle for authority in language quite often takes place 'within' the standard register itself. In other words, the conflict is over what counts as 'Arabic enough' between

language regulators. This will be clear when we consider the objectives of the Higher Commission for Arabicisation.

In November 1990, a presidential decree was issued directing the Arabicisation of higher education in Sudan. The Higher Commission for Arabicisation was established under the auspices of the Ministry of Higher Education. The principal mandate of the Higher Commission is to develop plans and measures for Arabicising the medium of instruction at institutions of higher education, and to follow up the implementation of this scheme in coordination with Arabicisation units in the Sudanese universities. The Higher Commission was set up to achieve this overall objective by:

(1) coordinating with universities to ensure the implementation of the presidential decree of Arabicisation in the institutions of higher education in Sudan;
(2) Arabicising and unifying scientific terminologies;
(3) providing scientific textbooks in various disciplines for universities;
(4) establishing a central library for scientific Arabic materials in various fields of scholarship;
(5) conducting and supporting scientific research on the Arabicisation of scientific terms, and disseminating university textbooks to support the Arabicisation and the appropriate implementation thereof;
(6) designing and disseminating guidelines for authorship, translation and publishing;
(7) commissioning and encouraging teachers to engage in authorship and translation;
(8) providing a technical supervision for the printing and publication of approved books;
(9) organising specialised symposia on Arabic language and linguistics to assist specialists to author, translate, and teach in Arabic;
(10) compiling technical dictionaries for various scientific fields.[2]

The Higher Commission was established with a specific and relatively well-defined goal: to Arabicise the medium of instruction in the institutions of higher education. Neither the revival of Arabic literary heritage nor the preservation of 'uncorrupted' Standard Arabic is part of its mandate. Even when the Arabic language and its linguistics (grammar) are highlighted, it is invoked in instrumentalist terms to aid translators and university lecturers to teach 'in Arabic'. The Higher Commission is structured into administrative units and a council. Membership of the council is drawn from representatives of the universities in the Sudan. Universities have set up their own Arabicisation authorities or commissions to implement and feedback on the Higher Commission's policies. Expertise in the Arabic grammatical or literary tradition is not a condition for membership of the Higher Commission. In fact, the

Council of the Higher Commission is directed by a Professor of Engineering at Khartoum University (Dafa`alla al-Turabi). The Arabicisation committee was formed at the Khartoum University in 1990 to lead the process. The policy to Arabicise the medium of teaching at the Khartoum University was implemented in the academic year 1990/1991. Its list of achievements includes: (1) compiling and publishing standard technical dictionaries in physics, chemistry, civil engineering, mathematics, agriculture and veterinary science; (2) constructing orthographic and spelling guides for translating 'foreign' names from and into Arabic; (3) disseminating a set of books on the use of mathematical notations in Arabic; (4) Arabicising units of measurement; (5) convening and participating in a number of conferences and seminars on Arabicisation in the Sudan and the Arab world; and (6) establishing a library.[3]

Both the Khartoum Academy and the Higher Commission are mechanisms of institutionalisation and the circulation of semiotic standards across time and space independently of the particularities of the context of their implementation. This may be unsurprising given the nature and objective of these institutions. For example, the visible agenda of the Khartoum Academy is largely corpus-planning oriented: establishing a canon of linguistic norms against which the actual praxis is evaluated. However, these practices are intended to maintain the 'image' of Arabic as a 'pure' or an 'uncorrupted' language. The Khartoum Academy focuses on Arabic not as an instrument of communication but as a symbolic code correlated with religion, subjectivity and history. Thus, from this perspective, any serious Arabicisation should strictly conform to the register of the Qur'an, prophetic teachings (*ḥadith*) and the Arabic literary tradition. For example, the Khartoum Academy submitted a memorandum to the government on Arabic complaining that Arabic intellectual studies are underemphasised while other branches of scholarship such as engineering and medicine are overemphasised (al-Ṭayyib 1996c). The Khartoum Academy pays serious attention to Arabic in its 'scriptal' mode of signification. In this regard, al-Ṭayyib (1996b, 14) argued that an attack on the Arabic language and its script under the banner of 'modernisation' and 'reform' was designed to distance Arabic from its heritage. Al-Ṭayyib (1996b, 14) went on to contend that the calls to 'Latinise' Arabic (to use the Roman letters for writing Arabic) are part of a planned 'war' against Arabic, Arabism and Islamic heritage. That is why 'orthographic reform' does not feature in the Khartoum Academy's list of objectives. The significant point here is that in Sudan, 'orthographies' are not merely technical tools for 'reducing' a spoken language; instead, they are symbolic resources that are seriously invested with cultural political histories.

Moreover, al-Ṭayyib (1996b, 14) pointed out that the unfortunate ignorance of a significant part of the Qur'an, prophetic teachings and Arabic (rhymed) poetry resulted from an attack on the pedagogic method of memorisation

used in the teaching of these texts. He contended that any assault on Arabic rhymed poetry and its metrics is an assault on the Qur'an by proxy, since, in his view, the learning of the former is intended to facilitate the interpretation of the latter. He was also extremely hostile to modern 'prose poetry' (*al-shi`r al-ḥur*) since, in his view, it aimed to widen the gap between Arabic and the Qur'an. For al-Ṭayyib (1996a, 75), 'the language of a nation is a title of their pride and glory' (*lughat al-qawm `inwan `izatahum wa-majdahum*).

The essence of al-Ṭayyib's argument is that modernisers and Orientalists intend to 'de-Arabise' Arabicisation by divorcing it from Islam and Arabic literary heritage. Thus, according to al-Ṭayyib (1996a, 1996b), Arabicisation in some countries is not 'Arabic enough' and the task is to 'Arabicise Arabicisation' (*labudda min-al-i`rab li-l-ta`rib*). He argued that for Arabicisation to be effective, Arabic language academies and other Arabic regulators (e.g. the Higher Commission) should recognise the centrality of the Qur'an and Arabic grammatical tradition in their implementation measures of Arabicisation policies. For al-Ṭayyib, Arabicisation can be accomplished in two stages or phases: a long-term phase that involves designing Qur'an-oriented Arabic pedagogic materials with a focus on Arabic lexico-grammatical processes, which would later be used as a basis for scientific coinages and translations. The short-term phase, on the other hand, should contain a language training course for those who are engaged with Arabicisation in the technical fields. The content of the course should involve principles of Arabic grammar, topics sourced from Arabic literary books, and a recitation of the Qur'an and the interpretation of part of it along with prophetic teachings (al-Ṭayyib 1996a).

Having broadly sketched the goals and objectives of the Khartoum Academy in contrast to those of the Higher Commission, in the next section, we discuss in some detail the linguistic ideology of the Khartoum Academy.

Discussion: Arabicising Arabicisation

The Khartoum Academy and the Higher Commission are part of the wider ideological project of *al-mashru` al-haḍari* imposed and circulated as a governing ideology by the Islamic ruling regime (see Section 3). In the previous section, we have shown that Arabic is a site of epistemic conflict between the Khartoum Academy and the Higher Commission. For example, al-Ṭayyib disqualifies the Arabicisation activities of the Higher Commission as not 'Arabic enough', thus it in itself requires to be 'Arabicised'. His argument against any positivistic treatment of Arabic is rooted in his belief in an organic correlation between the Qur'an and Arabic grammatical and literary heritage. It is these three textual sources, he believes, which should preserve the 'purity' of Arabic from the pedestrian (i.e. dialectal) and Orientalising

'corruption'. For space limitation, we restrict our discussion to the concepts of 'sacredness', 'purity' and 'heritage', since they are systematically deployed by the Khartoum Academy as rationalised resources for the construction of linguistic boundaries.

First, the remark that the Qur'an was enshrined in Arabic is an ideological rationalisation. Thus, the argument that the standardised and neatly refined language imposed by the Khartoum Academy 'does not exist' in the concrete reality of human interaction misses the normative goal of this institution. For the Khartoum Academy, or any other cultural system of centralising orientation, what merits existence as a discursive condition for reconstructing the 'Umma' as a globally 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991) is precisely this understanding of language as a homogenising 'register' regulating material linguistic approximations. Arabic, whether consciously or not, is codified as a 'sacred language'; thus it is perceived as a wholesale indivisible language. And we maintain that what is ideologically 'erased' in the process is the very phenomenology of Arabic as an 'ethnic language'. When professional linguists mobilise the cliché that 'all languages are equal', they are in fact displacing the ideological nature of the argument.

The distinction between Standard Arabic and its dialects is by no means a purely linguistic matter but rather an effect of a cultural exercise. Edwards (2012b, 13–14) rightly argued that 'our notions of "standard" and "non-standard" dialects rest upon foundations of social convention, and not – as many continue to think – upon any intrinsic differentiations in "goodness"'. To put it another way, if Arabicisation has been promoted on an exclusively linguistic basis (as a 'Chomskyan language'), then Standard Arabic is a language without history. If the 'purist' ideology of linguistic correctness, literary heritage, prestige, and sacredness, to name a few, are essentially normative values, then normativity is conflated with the (perceived) language-internal uniformity. This invisible conflation itself is an effect of a naturalising ideology. Understanding this point can explain why Arabic language academies are particularly antagonistic to the western theoretical disciplining of Arabic into 'Classical Arabic' and 'Modern Standard Arabic'.

However, this understanding of language, which is deeply entrenched in pedagogical spaces, should not be dismissed as 'artificial'. It is precisely this conception of language that is imposed by mainstream linguistics and welcomed by nationalist projects and re-appropriated by counter-hegemonic forces as an ideological resource for conducting cultural politics. Linell (2001, 110) rightly noted that there are 'close similarities between scholarly theories and popular views (everyday "social representations of language"). The explanation is that these have evolved under mutual influencing'. Besides, in the Khartoum Academy's view, the relatively unregulated translational activities by university physical science scholars from English into Arabic can potentially weaken the Arabic–Islam link. It is this dialectic between the

need for a regulated textual practice and the simultaneous urge to catch up with the West that shows why Arabicisation can never be achieved once and for all. To rephrase, Arabic as 'whole language' can be thought of as an ideologically organising template within which Arabic varieties are locally ordered and (de)valued. Arabicisation is always a project-in-progress.

A second observation is that the sources (the Qur'an, a poetic canon and a grammatical tradition) are fundamentally related to writing. Technically speaking, the effect of writing on the way we view Arabic can best be illustrated with reference to the significant sociolinguistic metaphor of 'diglossia'. As we mentioned in Section 2, Ferguson's classic account of diglossia has received intensive critiques and revisions by Ferguson (1991) himself. We just need to highlight a few points in relation to the discussion above on how writing or orthographic Literacy (with capital 'L') has shaped our view of Arabic as a 'pure' code. First, it should be noted that most of the diglossic features differentiating the standard from the colloquial are based on writing and lexico-grammatical rules abstracted through this technology (e.g. literary heritage, standardisation, grammar and lexicon). This has resulted in both the unqualified correlation of Standard Arabic with writing and its indexicalities of correction/purity, on the one hand, and the colloquial with orality and its associations with corruption/impurity, on the other (for a critique of the 'orality vs. literacy' binarism, see Street 1984; Juffermans, Asfaha, and Abdelhay 2014).

The view of Arabic, or in fact any other language, as the 'standard language' is performed through a process which is strictly ideological: a patterned 'enregistering' (Agha 2007) of Arabic with 'Arab heritage' and 'Islam'. In other words, standard languages are always 'language standards' (Joseph 1987). Any standard language is a construction (Milroy and Milroy 1985). Suleiman (2008) cogently argued that the full force of Arabic in the production of a 'linguistic community' (social solidarity) should be grasped at this level of metadiscursive exercise. The point here is that statements of complaints such as 'Arabic is under threat' are functional: they inculcate the 'image' of Arabic as a 'unified whole'. Interestingly, the pre- and early Islamic mode of organising the use of Arabic (Ferguson's 1959, H-variety) was by no means 'writing' but 'memory'; thus, it was integrated with everyday social life (see Macdonald 2010).

Furthermore, the ideological effect of writing on the way we conceive of Standard Arabic can be appreciated with reference to Ferguson's highly significant description of the sociolinguistic situation as 'relatively stable'. Diglossia or any form of social diversity indicates the existence of multiple competing ideologies of language associated with linguistic choices. What achieves the perception of the national sociolinguistic order as 'stable' is a complex of normalising conventions (e.g. a textual tradition) which is developed to organise, routinise and naturalise the regulation of access to social networks of power and interests. Since any social situation is relatively

dynamic by definition, the institutional activities of the selection and objectification of specific meanings for lexical items (e.g. in dictionaries) contribute not just to the stability of the communicative situation upon which actors' expectations are based, but, most importantly, they generally tend to determine patterns of membership for the participants and others. Symbolically, the Khartoum Academy or Arabic language academies generally have made a significant contribution in the orientation of linguistic practice as an index of membership in the wider Arabic-speaking community. Concretely, the Khartoum Academy is established to effect social integration (at the local level) and political solidarity (at the regional level) by imposing specific discursive patterns of acting and thinking about Arabic. However, meaning is never determined once and for all, since the dominant social practice is always subject to processes of appropriation, negotiation, and resistance (cf. Rampton's 2005 crossing/stylising). It is within this cultural political frame of conflict and struggle that 'language shift' is an effect of coercion and/or symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991; Paugh 2012); and most importantly, if we accept the Bakhtinian (1981) thesis of 'dialogicality' (as hybridity), then the idea of a clearly differentiated 'High-code' or 'Low-code' is problematic. Arabic in its 'Classical' register is always embedded in other discourses. In this late-modern, superdiversified world, diglossia as a 'linguistic culture' (Schiffman 1996) cannot be reduced to declared language policies. Understanding the complex nature of the social reality requires a methodological triangulation of Ferguson's normative thesis with an interactional sociolinguistic perspective (see Martin-Jones 1989). Such a hybrid perspective can allow us to avoid the fundamentalist trap of treating 'Arabic', 'the Muslims' and 'the Arab world', among others, as homogeneous or uniform entities rather than as circumstantial, dynamic and variegated.

However, understanding the national sociolinguistic orders as 'relatively stable' (as Ferguson rightly suggested) rather than as 'absolutely fixed' requires the re-theorisation of Arabic as a dynamic arena of historical struggle: diglossia viewed as a symbolic order of unequal relations is not consensually 'natural' but a consequence of complex historical forces and material practices of representation. In other words, diglossia as a normative arrangement of linguistic resources is an effect of ideological contestation and struggles over the control of domains of institutional power and knowledge production. As we have shown, Arabic in its 'standard' mode is itself an arena of dispute between the two mandated institutions of Arabicisation in Sudan. A related note here is that although the general pattern of learning 'Standard Arabic' is through the formal education system (with a focus on writing), we argue that it is a fallacy to represent this register as a 'no-person's land', or a language in its 'accentless' version. In other words, 'writing' itself is 'accented' though it is relatively regimented.

In addition, as we mentioned in Section 2 above, language academies emerged as anti-colonial institutions to undo colonial policies (e.g. Turkification) within the context of the modern nation-state. They intended to protect the 'boundaries' (thus the 'image') of Arabic as a constituent of a project of cultural articulation. The key distinction between the Khartoum Academy and the Higher Commission is that the former believes that it controls the textual canons through which any linguistic modernisation should be formulated and consequently 'recognised' as Arabic. Hence, what defines a true 'Arabicisation' is not the physical output of structural translations but the ideological process of canonical formation through which we imagine the linguistic homogeneity of Arabic. The Khartoum Academy's principles of canon construction constitute a regime of knowledge. That is, not any scholarship or work, no matter how 'original' it is, can automatically enter the canonical archive. This should be expected, since language regulators are by default institutions of exclusion and control. And in the case of the Khartoum Academy what is specifically subjected to control is not just the use of European languages, but the use of local dialects in institutional discourse. However, it is precisely this stance which lets the Khartoum Academy deal with an object without its semiotic history of use.

Arabic as a 'pure' language is represented not according to its actual pragmatics but rather with reference to self-referential textual heritage. One of the key corpus-planning functions is the regulation of the indexical nature of meaning. For example, the production of 'synchronic' dictionaries is primarily intended to stabilise the dynamic and contextually floating nature of meaning (to fix diversity itself). Thus, the 'whole Arabic' is represented as embodied in its dictionary. But meaning is not inherent in the 'dictionary word' but rather in its conditions of possibility and the socially shared patterns of interpretation. Even though language 'in context' is always genred, it is always open to further orders of meaning. What is called 'literal meaning' is fundamentally ideological meaning from top to bottom (it is always someone's meaning). And what makes us perceive it as 'natural' or 'universally' fixed is the lengthy effect of ideological strategies of artefactualisation (e.g. dictionaries) by language regulators. And if social meaning is historically subject to meta-discursive processes of decontextualisation and recontextualisation, this should logically mean that the concept of 'linguistic purity' is fictional to the core. A language has a discursive trajectory without a definitive 'origin'. If this 'natural history of discourse' (Silverstein and Urban 1996) is professionally and publicly recognised, then the whole project of 'Arabicisation' and its indexical associations (e.g. purity, sacredness) should immediately collapse. And this may indicate why both (pan-)nationalist and anti-nationalist formations are extremely hostile to the conception of language as a dynamic social practice.

The concept of 'sacredness' implies a 'reflective' theory of language whereby language reflects a particular understanding of reality: Arabic is 'sacred' because it is the language in which the Qur'an is revealed. Thus, the reality, we maintain, is not a 'social reality' as such. The logic here is that if social reality is, by definition, dynamic, a reflective account of language holds that language should change correspondingly. And it is here that the concept of 'sacredness' can achieve double functions: Arabic reflects a textual reality which is not historically constructed but God-given, and since the text of the Qur'an cannot be altered, Arabic 'mimetically' reflects this unchanging text. Thus, the dominant ideology of Arabic can have it both ways: it reflects a reality but not a historically constituted reality.

In addition, in the Sudan, Arabic is a language with socially dynamic values, and this valuation depends on the organising pattern of indexicality in which it is embedded and the intricate details of local interaction. The identities of individuals and groups are intersected and overdetermined by various histories and multiple centres of orientation which unequally shaped their sociolinguistic repertoires. Thus, any claim about 'linguistic purity' whether in terms of language or identity has its logic in ideology rather than nature. And when a language is conceptualised as 'pure', it is depoliticised (not to be confused with 'neutral'). And it is here that the structuralist view of language (particularly in its Chomskyan mode) as a self-generating code dovetails neatly with the Arabic grammatical tradition: the institutional practices have relentlessly cultivated the idea that there is an invariably 'sacred' (thus 'real') Arabic pitted against ideologically 'unreal' linguistic distortions. The detemporalising exercises of canon formation (christening and circulating specific text-artefacts as timeless 'classic manuscripts') have reinforced the binary view that the contemporary intellectual productions ought to recognisably replicate the 'original' patterns of construction. However, this sense of 'originality' of the canons is itself an effect of replication strategies. In other words, if 'Arabic heritage', which Arabic language academies generally intended to protect, is repeatedly being disembedded and re-embedded into new temporalities, then its 'authenticity' is not 'given' but rather a product of semiotic practice.

The concept of 'heritage' involves a process of decontextualisation of texts from their material and cultural conditions of existence and their reinsertion into different symbolic orders. Hence, heritage is a 'history' without social struggle redeployed to do specific ideological work. Most significantly, the reproduction and mediated transmission of an inherited textual legacy involves a process of institutional intervention. Although the whole process is constructed, the output of the exercise is represented as an accurate record 'reflecting' a language in its 'purity'. Thus, the panoptical gaze is effectively 'erased' through the ideological strategy of representation itself. This is the 'mimetic theory' of language in operation. This indicates that the practice

of linguistics itself is deeply implicated in the ideological naturalisation of social orders.

The key point is not that the linguistic practices of the Khartoum Academy are 'ideological', since there is no 'value neutral' practice. Rather, the serious issue, as Joseph and Taylor (1990) noted, is when covert guiding ideologies underlying selective practices deceptively masquerade as 'objective' scientific scholarship. Another related point is that the process of Arabicisation itself contributes to the fragmentation of Arabic, since Arabic is normatively used in always indexically charged contexts. That is, if language is by definition a historical construction, then the more Arabic spreads, the more fragmented it becomes. More than four decades ago, Qasim (1975), the late professor of Arabic at Khartoum University, raised this point:

> Human beings are products of their environment and are therefore subject to its continuous impact … It is noteworthy here that the variety of Arabic which was most susceptible to change was none other than *the standard Arabic* which imposed itself on certain Arab tribes as a result of particular historical and social factors (and which, in this respect, was an artificial creation, especially if we view it outside its historical and social fabric). (Qasim 1975, 94, our emphasis)

In short, if any language embodies the seeds of its destruction in the very logic of its (en)globalisation, then serious ideological work is required to sustain its 'image' as a 'named language'. And this is precisely the meta-discursive function of language academies and other social institutions: to engage in the struggle to stabilise this image through specific textual practices of stereotyping. This is how language academies contribute to the fixing of diversity to achieve specific symbolic functions including the construction of the sense of nationhood and social solidarity with other political societies in the Arab world. However, since this normative ritualisation of Arabic as a 'pure', 'sacred' language hinges on the (imagined) existence of 'impure' and 'corrupted' Other, then the local dialects of Arabic, English and local languages are handy candidates to fill in this 'Other' position. It is in this sense, we argue, that Arabicisation contributes to the maintenance of local languages at the level of ideological imagination. Since people or individuals from different parts of the Sudan do not share precisely the same historical trajectories, then the question of power is present in every act of communication. And if Arabic has never spread uniformly in Sudan, this means that 'multiculturalism' itself is a product of discursive interaction, and not simply the result of a top-down language policy.

Conclusion

To achieve the key objectives of this paper, we have reviewed the historical and cultural affiliations of the Khartoum Arabic Language Academy with a focus on its linguistic ideologies. We have shown how the effect of its ideology

of language is achieved by operating via a complex of other discourses (e.g. religion and heritage). We have also compared and contrasted the Khartoum Academy with the Higher Commission for Arabicisation in Sudan. We have demonstrated that due to the dynamic nature of the social situation, and the emergence of competing ideologies over the ownership of language, Arabicisation is always a project-in-progress.

Notes

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3. Accessed December 15, 2014. http://mohe.gov.sd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73&Itemid=69.

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